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RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS OF THE 
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: LOWER PRICES NOW 
IN EXCHANGE FOR LESS PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION LATER? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the twentieth century, researchers building on the 
pioneering work of Louis Pasteur1 developed an incredible array of 
chemicals to treat many diseases which, for much of humanity’s existence, 
had caused certain death.2 Perhaps the greatest example of the good that 
pharmaceutical research brings is the polio vaccine developed by Jonas 
Salk.3 As a result of pharmaceutical advances, Americans expect science 
to solve their most vexing health problems. For the most part, science has 
succeeded in meeting this huge expectation, as even today there remains 
hope that an effective AIDS vaccine can be developed.4 In addition, 
scientists and lay people alike expect that new and more effective drugs to 
combat diseases such as cancer,5 cystic fibrosis,6 and even Alzheimer’s 
 1. See, e.g., David V. Cohen, The Life and Times of Louis Pasteur, Address at the Centennial 
Celebration of the Death of Louis Pasteur, Louisville University (1996), at 
http://www.labexplorer.com/louis_pasteur.htm. “The crowning achievements of Pasteur’s career were 
development of the germ theory of disease and the use of vaccines to prevent these diseases.” Id. 
 2. James Fitzgerald, The Troubled Healer, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO MAGAZINE, Spring 2002, 
available at http://www.magazine.utoronto.ca/02spring/f07.htm (detailing the life of Canadian 
scientist John Gerald FitzGerald, who “studied at the Pasteur Institute in Paris and Brussels, learning 
how to make rabies, diphtheria and smallpox vaccines and antitoxins under the mantle of Dr. Emile 
Roux, Louis Pasteur’s right-hand man and a co-creator of the world’s first diphtheria antitoxin”). 
 3. See People and Discoveries: Salk Produces Polio Vaccine, 1952 (1998), at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aso/databank/entries/dm52sa.html. “The impact [of the Salk vaccine] was 
dramatic: In 1955 there were 28,985 cases of polio; in 1956, 14,647; in 1957, 5,894. By 1959, 90 other 
countries used Salk’s vaccine.” Id. 
 4. Associated Press, AIDS Vaccine Fails but Shows Some Promise (Feb. 24, 2002), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/wire/Living/ap20030224_2112.html (describing a recent experimental AIDS 
vaccine that gave no statistically significant benefit to the overall experimental population, but did 
appear to confer at least some benefit to the small number of African- and Asian-American volunteers 
who participated in the study).  
 5. See, e.g., New Anti-Cancer Drug to be Trialed on Humans, MESOTHELIOMA WEB, at 
http://www.mesotheliomaweb.org/solbecabc.html (indicating that a drug developed by an Australian 
pharmaceutical company that cured thirty percent of mice with malignant mesothelioma, a form of 
lung cancer, with one dose, will be tested on humans) (last visited Nov. 30, 2003). 
 6. See Press Release, Emory Health Sciences, Emory Tests Promising New Cystic Fibrosis 
Drug (June 1, 1998), available at http://www.emory.edu/WHSC/HSNEWS/releases/jun98/ 
060198cf.html (describing an experimental drug called CPX that may ameliorate a protein defect that 
causes cystic fibrosis symptoms). 
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disease7 can be developed.8 While the reasons for these advances are 
surely varied, many feel that the basic driving force behind pharmaceutical 
innovation is the incentive structure provided by the United States patent 
system,9 which allows companies to recoup the enormous costs associated 
with developing a new drug10 and still make a healthy profit.11 However, 
while people expect new medicines, they do not wish to pay the prices that 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies charge for them.12
Congress attempted to deal with this fundamental conflict by 
implementing the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act,13 more commonly known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act.”14 This statute 
was enacted in 1984 in response to the dearth of generic pharmaceutical 
products on the market.15 The Hatch-Waxman Act has increased the 
 7. New Alzheimer’s Drug Seems to Slow Disease Progression, Research Shows (July 12, 2000), 
at http://www.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/aging/07/12/alzheimers.drug/index.html (discussing results of 
an experiment involving the drug memantine). 
 8. See, e.g., supra notes 5-7. 
 9. Update: Bush to Close Hatch-Waxman Loopholes, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Oct. 28, 2002 
at 1. When introducing the proposed regulation that is central to this Note, President Bush stated: 
“with patent protection, America’s brand-name drug companies have become the greatest in the world, 
and health care systems around the world depend on American inventions they could not possibly 
duplicate.” Id. Bush also stated: “we recognize innovators must be able to be financially rewarded for 
their creativity and hard work so they will continue investing and researching . . . we want these 
breakthroughs to become affordable and widely available. Both of these goals, innovation and 
accessibility, are essential, and both are possible.” Id. 
 10. Charles Boersig, Patent Woes for Big Pharma: Generic Manufacturers Are Becoming 
Increasingly Aggressive in Their Efforts to Invalidate Drug Patents, MED AD NEWS, Nov. 2002, at 60. 
“On average, bringing a new medicine to market takes ten to fifteen years and costs about $800 
million.” Id. “Without patents to protect all the invention necessary to develop a drug, at least for a 
limited time, others could copy the drugs immediately, offering their versions at a reduced price since 
they did not incur the high costs to develop the drug.” Id. “This process would seriously impact 
research-based pharmaceutical companies’ ability to recoup costs and invest in other research 
projects.” Id. 
 11. For example, Pfizer’s drug Zoloft, which is Pfizer’s second-best selling drug, made a profit 
of $2.742 billion in 2002. In Brief, WORLD MARKET ANALYSIS 1, Feb. 25, 2003. 
 12. Ben Peck, CONSUMER VIEWS ON HATCH-WAXMAN REFORMS, available at 
http://www.fdli.org/conf/handouts/hw02/hw_peck.PDF (online version of a handout prepared by 
Public Citizens’ Congress Watch describing recent increases in average drug costs and arguing for 
reforms to the Hatch-Waxman Act that would likely increase the availability of less-expensive generic 
alternatives to brand-name pharmaceuticals). 
 13. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 [hereinafter Hatch-
Waxman Act], Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 
(2003) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)–(h) (2003)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC 
Study [hereinafter FTC Study] (July 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/ 
genericdrugstudy.pdf. “By 1984, the FDA estimated that there were approximately 150 brand-name 
drugs whose patents had expired for which there was no generic equivalent.” Id. at 4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/5
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availability of generic pharmaceuticals, as intended, and this in turn has 
resulted in large savings to consumers.16  
Although previous law17 allowed generic competitors to make and sell 
pharmaceutical products with the same chemical make-up as brand-name 
pharmaceuticals after the patent on the brand-name pharmaceutical 
ended,18 the process by which such generics could be approved was 
cumbersome.19 The expense and time required to obtain approval for a 
generic version of a brand-name drug was substantial.20 As a result, few 
companies attempted to obtain approval for generic versions of drugs from 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).21 Thus, even after the brand-
name drug’s patent protection ended, the manufacturer of that 
pharmaceutical retained a de facto patent on the product22 because it did 
not make economic sense for a different manufacturer to attempt to obtain 
FDA approval.23
This setting created a situation in which pharmaceutical prices stayed 
extremely high even after patent protection for individual pharmaceuticals 
ended.24 Congress recognized this problem and passed the Hatch-Waxman 
Act in order to facilitate and expedite generic competitors’ entrance into 
the pharmaceutical market.25 The Hatch-Waxman Act encouraged the 
development of generic pharmaceuticals by allowing generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to expedite the FDA approval process by 
relying on the trade secret information held by the name-brand 
 16. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 9. “The [Congressional Budget Office] estimated that, in 
1994, the availability of generic drugs saved purchasers between $8 billion and $10 billion.” Id. (citing 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected 
Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry 31 (July 1998), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index’655&sequence’0). 
 17. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 3. The 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act were the controlling law before the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. 
 18. See PhRMA, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT IN PERSPECTIVE: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
CONTEXT FOR THE FTC’S GENERIC DRUG STUDY-FTC FILE NO. V000014 2 7 (2002) [hereinafter 
Hatch-Waxman in Perspective], at http://www.phrma.org/publications/ policy/2002-06-24.435.pdf. 
 19. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 3. “Those seeking to market a generic version of an 
existing post-1962 brand-name drug also had to perform their own safety and efficacy studies, much 
like the brand-name companies had to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the brand-name drug[s].” 
Id. 
 20. See id. at 3, 5 (indicating that the process generic companies had to follow to get a generic 
drug approved by the FDA was similar to the expensive and time-consuming process required of 
brand-name companies).
 21. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4. 
 22. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. See also Hatch-Waxman in Perspective, supra note 18, at 3. 
 25. See, e.g., Gerald D. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the 
Drug Development Process 187 (1999). 
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pharmaceutical companies.26 In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act provided 
incentives for generic pharmaceutical manufacturing companies to 
challenge and design around name-brand pharmaceutical manufacturers’ 
patents.27 Provisions benefiting brand-name pharmaceutical companies 
were also included.28 The Hatch-Waxman Act achieved its intended effect, 
as the number of generic entrants into the pharmaceutical market increased 
markedly after 1984.29
Despite the Hatch-Waxman Act’s success, in recent years it has 
become apparent that brand-name pharmaceutical makers are still able to 
keep generic pharmaceutical manufacturers who challenge the brand-name 
company’s patents from gaining FDA approval.30 In July of 2002, the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) released a study that examined the 
practical effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions that encourage 
generic pharmaceutical makers to challenge brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ patents.31 This study proposed various amendments to the 
Hatch-Waxman Act in order to close loopholes in the Act.32 The Senate 
passed a bill containing amendments similar to these recommendations in 
2002,33 but the House of Representatives did not pass the analogous bill.34  
 26. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4. “[G]eneric applicants were permitted to rely on the brand-
name company’s trade secret data demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the brand-name drug 
product.” Id. 
 27. Id. at 5; see also FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATIONS FOR 
FDA APPROVAL TO MARKET A NEW DRUG; PATENT LISTING REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICATION OF 
30-MONTH STAYS ON APPROVAL OF ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS CERTIFYING THAT A 
PATENT CLAIMING A DRUG IS INVALID OR WILL NOT BE INFRINGED 17 [hereinafter FTC Comments] 
(Dec. 23, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030002.pdf. 
 28. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4. To compensate the brand name drug manufacturers for the 
time and money they have invested in developing the pharmaceuticals, the Hatch-Waxman Act also 
contains various provisions that extend the length of certain patent classes. Id. See also Abbott Labs. v. 
Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“[The Hatch-Waxman Act] 
emerged from Congress’s efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name-brand 
drug manufacturers to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, 
while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market.”) 
(citations omitted). The patent extension aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act are beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
 29. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 9. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office estimated 
that the availability of generic alternatives to brand-name drugs had saved buyers between $8 billion to 
$10 billion by 1994. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How Increased Competition from Generic 
Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry 31 (July 1998), available at 
http:www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index’655&sequence’0. 
 30. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 40. 
 31. Id. at 1. “The study was designed to determine whether [anti-competitive] agreements are 
isolated instances or more typical, and whether particular provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments are susceptible to strategies to delay or deter consumer access to low-cost generic 
alternatives to brand-name drug products.” Id. 
 32. See generally FTC Study, supra note 15. 
 33. S. 812, 107th Cong. §§ 103–105 (2002). See infra note 100 and accompanying text. See also 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/5
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In response to the FTC study, the FDA, through its rulemaking 
authority,35 issued a notice of a proposed rule on October 24, 2002.36 After 
receiving various comments regarding this proposed rule, the FDA 
promulgated a regulation on June 18, 2003, that implements some, but not 
all, of the changes proposed in the initial FTC study.37 The remainder of 
this Note will briefly discuss the development of the statutory and 
regulatory standards for the approval of pharmaceutical products as well as 
the changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act and FDA regulations proposed in 
2002 by the FTC, the FDA, and Congress, as well as those promulgated by 
the FDA in 2003. This discussion will focus primarily on the topics raised 
in the 2002 FTC study. This Note will also explain how some of the 
changes will benefit consumers, while others will stifle innovation, 
thereby causing a reduction in the rate at which new drug treatments for 
various diseases are discovered and marketed.38
II. HISTORY 
A. The Statutory Framework 
In 1962, Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act39 
(“FDCA”) to require companies seeking to sell new pharmaceuticals to 
Press Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Prescription Drugs, 2002 WL 
31369479, *1 (Oct. 21, 2002). 
 34. H.R. 1862, 107th Cong. (2001). See also Senators Tout Support for Generics Bill, Urge 
House Action, GENERIC LINE, Vol. 20. No. 12 (June 18, 2003) (noting that H.R. 1862 did not pass). 
For a discussion of the process by which federal legislation is introduced and passed, see MORRIS L. 
COHEN ET AL., HOW TO FIND THE LAW 219–41 (1989). 
 35. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2003). 
 36. Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Listing Requirements and 
Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a 
Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not be Infringed [hereinafter FDA Proposed Rule], 67 Fed. 
Reg. 65,448 (proposed Oct. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). 
 37. Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing 
Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed, 
[hereinafter 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation], 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). The effective date of this rule was August 18, 2003. Id. For an overview 
of the rulemaking process, see generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 
411–15 (4th ed. 2002). The Food and Drug Administration’s rulemaking authority is based on the 
provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). 
 38. “[I]nnovation . . . will be harder in [the] future because the easy fruit has been picked off and 
the diseases now being investigated involve harder science and more sophisticated problems.” 
Waxman-Hatch Has Boosted Generics, But Jury Still Out on Effects on Innovators, PHARMA 
MARKETLETTER, Jan. 6, 2003 LEXIS, Nexis Library, Pharma Market letter file. 
 39. 21 U.S.C. § 301-397 (2000). 
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“prove that new drugs are safe and effective prior to FDA approval.”40 The 
FDCA required pharmaceutical companies to conduct clinical trials on 
new pharmaceuticals and submit the results to the FDA along with their 
“new drug application” (“NDA”).41 The 1962 amendments required 
pharmaceutical companies seeking to sell generic versions of these drugs 
to perform the same studies to show the safety and efficacy of the generic 
products.42 This requirement was very expensive and resulted in very few 
generic pharmaceuticals on the market.43 In addition, the FDCA stated that 
companies selling generic drugs could not begin the FDA approval 
process for their generic pharmaceuticals until after the patents on the 
analogous brand-name pharmaceutical had expired, restricting those 
companies’ access to the market.44
In response to the dearth of generic pharmaceuticals, Congress passed 
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,45 
commonly known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act” (“Hatch-Waxman” or “the 
Act”). Hatch-Waxman allows generic pharmaceutical companies to rely 
on the safety and efficacy data compiled by the brand-name companies 
during the FDA approval process.46 The Act also allows the generic drug 
manufacturers to begin the approval process before the patents on brand-
name drugs expire.47 Finally, the Act requires brand-name companies that 
file NDAs to provide the FDA with information about the patents covering 
the pharmaceutical products.48 The FDA lists these patents in a publication 
entitled “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations,”49 known as the “Orange Book” because of its cover’s 
color.50  
Instead of requiring a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer to follow 
the strict NDA requirements, the Act allows it to file an “Abbreviated New 
Drug Application”51 (“ANDA”), with the obligation  
 40. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 3. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 4. “[B]y 1984 . . . there were approximately 150 brand-name drugs whose patents had 
expired for which there was no generic equivalent.” Id. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 44. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4. See also Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 
858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 45. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
 46. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4. 
 47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000). 
 48. Id. 
 49. FDA Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,448 (proposed Oct. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 314). 
 50. Id. 
 51. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/5
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to demonstrate that the generic drug product has the same active 
ingredient, route of administration, dosage form and strength, and 
proposed labeling as the brand-name drug. The ANDA also must 
contain sufficient information to demonstrate that the generic drug 
is “bioequivalent”52 to the relevant brand-name product.53  
The ANDA must also have a certification for each patent listed in the 
Orange Book that is related to the brand-name pharmaceutical at issue.54 
The Act provides the generic drug manufacturers with four different 
certification options:55 (1) the brand-name company has not filed the 
required patent information for the pharmaceutical product;56 (2) the patent 
for the brand-name pharmaceutical has expired;57 (3) the patent on the 
brand-name product has not yet expired but will expire on a specified date, 
at which time the generic drug manufacturer will begin marketing its 
product;58 or (4) the patent held by the brand-name drug manufacturers is 
either invalid or will not be infringed by the product that the generic drug 
manufacturer will produce and sell.59 This last certification option is 
referred to as a paragraph IV certification.60
A paragraph IV certification by a generic drug manufacturer implicates 
two provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and “these two provisions are 
at the heart of the FTC’s study.”61 First, the ANDA filer must provide 
notice to the patent holder and NDA filer.62 If the patent holder files a 
 52. “Bioequivalence means that the rate and extent of absorption of the generic drug is not 
significantly different from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at 
the same dosage.” FTC Study, supra note 15, at 5 n.26. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000). 
 55. Id. See also FTC Study, supra note 15, at 6 for a graphic representation of the various 
certification options available under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 56. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I) (2000). This certification is referred to as a “paragraph I 
certification.” FTC Study, supra note 15, at 6. If the ANDA filer makes this type of certification, the 
FDA may approve the sale of the generic product immediately. See id.  
 57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II) (2000). This is referred to as a “paragraph II certification.” 
FTC Study, supra note 15, at 6. Upon submission of this type of certification, the FDA may 
immediately approve the sale of the generic product. See id.  
 58. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III) (2000). This is referred to as a “paragraph III certification.” 
FTC Study, supra note 15, at 6. If the ANDA filer makes this type of certification, the FDA may 
approve the ANDA with a stipulation that the approval is effective on the date that the patent held by 
the brand-name company expires. See id.  
 59. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000). This is referred to as a “paragraph IV certification.” 
FTC Study, supra note 15, at 6. Approval of an ANDA filed under this type of certification is the 
focus of the recent proposed changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act and the regulatory scheme that exists 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. 
 60. FTC Study supra note 15, at 6. 
 61. Id. 
 62. The Act States: 
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lawsuit for patent infringement within forty-five days of the notice, the 
FDA automatically stays approval of the ANDA for thirty months.63 Once 
this occurs, FDA approval of the generic drug is stayed until “the earliest 
of: (1) the date the patent(s) expire; (2) a final determination of non-
infringement or patent invalidity by a court in the patent litigation; or (3) 
the expiration of 30 months from the receipt of notice of the paragraph IV 
certification.”64 In addition, the first generic applicant who files an ANDA 
with the FDA is entitled to 180 days of marketing exclusivity, during 
which time the FDA is not allowed to approve any other ANDAs for the 
same pharmaceutical.65  
B. The FTC’s 2002 Study of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
The FTC study, relying in part on an earlier study performed by the 
Congressional Budget Office,66 found that the Hatch-Waxman Act made 
pharmaceuticals much less expensive overall by promoting generic 
entrants67 but resulted in a slight increase in the cost of brand-name 
pharmaceutical products.68 The study also found that the Hatch-Waxman 
Act has resulted in much greater availability of generic versions of brand-
An applicant who makes a certification described in subparagraph (A)(vii)(IV) shall include 
in the application a statement that the applicant will give the notice required by clause (ii) 
to— 
I. each owner of the patent which is the subject of the certification or the representative of 
such owner designated to receive such notice, and 
II. the holder of the approved application under subsection (b) of this section for the drug 
which is claimed by the patent or a use of which is claimed by the patent or the representative 
of such holder designated to receive such notice. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (2000). 
 63. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003). See also FTC Study, supra note 15, at 7. 
 64. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 7. 
 65. The Act states: 
If the application contains a certification described in subclause (IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii) 
and is for a drug for which a previous application has been submitted under this subsection 
continuing such a certification, the application shall be made effective not earlier than one 
hundred and eighty days after— 
I. the date the Secretary receives notice from the applicant under the previous application of 
the first commercial marketing of the drug under the previous application, or 
II. the date of a decision of a court in an action described in clause (iii) holding the patent 
which is the subject of the certification to be invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 66. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 9 (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How Increased 
Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry 31 
(July 1998), available at http:www.cbo.gov/ showdoc.cfm?index’655&sequence’0.) 
 67. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 9. 
 68. Id. See also Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry and Price 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331 (1992). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/5
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name drugs.69 Despite the success of the Hatch-Waxman Act in promoting 
generic entrance into the pharmaceutical market, the FTC study found that 
the Act contained various loopholes that allowed brand-name 
manufacturers to extend the life of their monopoly over the sales of their 
pharmaceutical products by keeping generic entrants out of the market.70  
1. Loopholes Allow for Extensions of the Thirty-Month Stay 
One way that brand-name drug manufacturers are able to exclude 
generics from entering the market is to list a new patent in the Orange 
Book.71 Although there are guidelines governing what can be listed in the 
Orange Book,72 at least one court has held that there is no private right of 
action to force the FDA to delist an improperly listed patent.73 
Exacerbating the problem, the FDA has refused to examine the Orange 
Book for improperly listed patents,74 stating that its resources are better 
spent elsewhere.75 If a thirty-month stay has already begun when the new 
patent is listed, the generic drug manufacturers must re-certify the new 
listing.76 At this point the brand-name drug manufacturers has forty-five 
days to sue for patent infringement on this newly listed patent.77 If the 
brand-name manufacturer does sue, a new thirty-month stay on approval 
of the ANDA begins to toll.78 The FTC study found that delays of up to 
sixty-five months have resulted.79
 69. Boersig, Patent Woes for Big Pharma, supra note 10, at 60. In 2002, generic drugs 
comprised over forty-seven percent of the prescriptions filled for pharmaceutical products. Id. This is 
up from nineteen percent in 1984, when Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. Also, “[b]y 
2005, generic drugs are expected to represent 57% of the market.” Id. 
 70. See generally FTC Study, supra note 15, at 9. 
 71. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 40 “In 8 instances, brand-name companies have listed later-
issued patents in the Orange Book after an ANDA has been filed for the drug product.” Id.  
 72. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2003). 
 73. See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 74. 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, supra note 37, at 36,683. “We also decline to create a 
new process for de-listing patents or for internal FDA review of patents beyond the limited review of 
the patent declaration described in this final rule.” Id. See also FTC Study, supra note 15, at 44. 
 75. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 50,338, 50,343 (Oct. 3, 1994) (explaining the rule codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). “FDA does not 
have the expertise to review patent information. The agency believes that its scarce resources would be 
better utilized in reviewing applications rather than reviewing patent claims.” Id.  
 76. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 43-44. See also Robert Coakley, Limited 30-month stays; News 
from Rockville; Generic Drug Approvals, MED AD NEWS, No. 11, Vol. 21, at 86 (Nov. 1, 2002) 
(stating that brand-name pharmaceutical companies have been able to obtain delays in the entry of 
generic competitors of up to sixty-five months by filing multiple patent infringement suits against 
generic companies who have filed Paragraph IV certifications). 
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000). 
 78. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 44. 
 79. Id. at 49 (Table 4-3). The patent holder for the patents covering the drug Hytrin (Terazosin) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p829 Robinson book pages.doc2/6/2004   2:52 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
838 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:829 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Another Loophole Allows “Parking” of the 180-Day Exclusivity 
Period 
The FTC study also found that in many cases where the patent holder 
sued the potential generic entrant, the ensuing litigation ended in a 
settlement.80 One form of such settlements allows the generic 
manufacturer to market the brand-name product under its generic name.81 
In such a situation, the generic manufacturer is not selling its form of the 
pharmaceutical; rather, it is essentially acting as a distributor for the brand-
name producer.82 If this generic company is the first to file an ANDA for 
the pharmaceutical, it obtains the 180-day marketing exclusivity rights to 
the generic product.83 However, because the generic company is not 
selling its own product, the 180-day period does not begin to run.84 Thus, 
this agreement, in effect, precludes other generic companies from entering 
into the generic market.85 Although this scenario has not yet occurred,86 
the FTC viewed it as a strong possibility.87 The FTC has the authority to 
nullify such agreements and prosecute the participants under its antitrust 
enforcement authority88 if the agreements are anti-competitive.89 However, 
the FTC has been somewhat reluctant to find antitrust liability in these 
agreements;90 in 2002, an FTC Commissioner spoke of the difficulty in 
in tablet form obtained three stays that had the potential to last up to seventy months, but the stays 
were not overlapping. Id. The total stay length in the litigation involving Paxil (Paroxetine 
Hydrochloride) was sixty-five months. Id. 
 80. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 27. Twenty out of fifty-three cases included in the FTC Study 
in “which a brand-name company sued the first generic applicant who had filed an ANDA containing 
a paragraph IV certification settled.” Id. 
 81. Id. at 28. 
 82. Id. at 30. This was the case in two of the settlements studied by the FTC. The study does not 
state the parties involved in these settlements. Id.  
 83. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 84. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 57. 
 85. Id. at 63. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. Such agreements have “the potential to ‘park’ the first generic applicant’s 180-day 
exclusivity for some period of time, thus preventing FDA approval of any subsequent eligible 
applicants.” Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 88. Scott P. Perlman & Jay S. Brown, FTC Targets Patent Settlement Agreements, NAT’L L.J., 
Nov. 11, 2002, at C1. “Since the late 1990s, U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities have greatly 
increased their scrutiny of the potential anti-competitive effects of patent settlements.” Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. In recent years, the FTC has successfully sought consent decrees in a number of 
enforcement actions involving pharmaceutical companies. Id. See, e.g., Biovail Corp., 67 Fed. Reg. 
44,606 (July 3, 2002); Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 18,636 (Apr. 10, 2001); Abbott 
Labs., 65 Fed. Reg. 17,502 (Apr. 3, 2000). However, a recent failure by the FTC, in In re Schering-
Plough Corp., 2002 FTC Lexis 40 (June 27, 2002), “has reinforced the original notion that genuine 
settlements that do not extend the reach of the patent should not be condemned as anti-competitive.” 
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determining whether these agreements should ever be subject to easy-to-
apply per se rules.91 The FTC regarded the possibility of anti-competitive 
settlement agreements as another possible loophole that could undermine 
the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act.92
C. The FTC’s Proposed Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Based on its findings, the FTC proposed amendments to the Hatch-
Waxman Act.93 The FTC proposed that only one thirty-month stay be 
issued for each pharmaceutical patent listed in the Orange Book.94 The 
FTC also sent a Citizen Petition to the FDA95 wherein the FTC requested 
the FDA to clarify its position on what properly may be listed in the 
Orange Book.96 To combat settlement agreements that “park”97 the 180-
day period of exclusivity,98 the FTC recommended that Congress “[p]ass 
legislation to require brand-name drug manufactures and first generic 
applicants to provide copies of certain agreements to the [FTC]”.99
Perlman & Brown, supra note 88, at C1. For more in-depth treatment of the antitrust issues implicated 
by agreements between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies, see Julia Rosenthal, 
Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive Settlements Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug 
Manufacturers, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317 (2002), and Elizabeth Stanley, An Ounce of Prevention: 
Analysis of Drug Patent Settlements Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 345 
(2002). 
 91. Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part 
II (2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharmaceuticalsettlement.htm. 
Commissioner Leary refers to payments, as part of agreements between brand-name and generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, flowing from the brand-name company to the generic company in 
return for delayed generic entry into the market as “reverse payments.” Id. “The presence of reverse 
payments, therefore, may provide an objective test for finding likely consumer harm without a difficult 
inquiry into the merits of the patent litigation.” Id. However, the Commissioner goes on to state that he 
“would not suggest at this stage that the presumption be conclusive (which would be another way of 
saying reverse payments are illegal per se) until we learn more from ongoing investigations and from 
the responses to our industry survey.” Id. 
 92. See, e.g., FTC Study, supra note 15, at 63. 
 93. Id. at ii. 
 94. Id.  
 95. See id. at 65-68 for a detailed explanation of FDA citizen petitions. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See supra notes 79-83, 87 and accompanying text. 
 98. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 99. FTC Study, supra note 15, at vi. For a Congressional response to this recommendation, see 
Drug Competition Act of 2002, S. 754, 107th Cong. § 5 (2002), infra note 104. Additionally, the FTC 
also made two “minor” recommendations: “Clarify that ‘commercial marketing’ includes the first 
generic applicant’s marketing of the brand-name product” and “[c]odify that the decision of any court 
on the same patent being litigated by the first generic applicant constitutes a ‘court decision’ sufficient 
to start the running of the 180-day exclusivity.” Id. at ix. A third minor recommendation made by the 
FTC is beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at x.  
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D. Proposed Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2002 
In response to the FTC’s recommendations, the Senate passed a bill100 
to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act in the summer of 2002 that would have, 
in large part, implemented the FTC recommendations.101 However, the 
House of Representatives did not pass the analogous bill,102 despite 
President Bush’s support for the amendments.103 The Senate also passed a 
bill that would have required certain settlement agreements to be filed with 
the FTC.104 The House of Representatives has not yet passed this bill.105
 100. Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2002, S. 812, 107th Cong. §§ 103-105 
(2002). This bill would have enacted a number of changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act. First, the bill 
allowed an automatic thirty-month stay only when a paragraph IV certification was filed for a patent 
that was listed within thirty days after approval of the brand name drug manufacturer’s NDA. Id. at 
§ 104(a)(1)(A)(ii). Additionally, the bill contained a forfeiture provision that allowed subsequent 
ANDA to take the place of the first ANDA. Id. at § 105(a)(2). The bill also would have created a 
limited private right of action allowing a party to challenge the propriety of patents in the Orange 
Book; the bill allowed the challenging party to recover damages. Id. at § 103(a)(1). For practical 
analysis of the provisions of S. 812, see Christopher T. Griffith, Senate Passes Bill Revising Hatch-
Waxman Framework for Generic Drug Approval (2002), at http://www.leydig.com/News/ 
raf_sep2002.asp. Cf. infra note 146. 
 101. Press Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Prescription Drugs, 2002 
WL 31369479, *4 (Oct. 21, 2002). See also Generic Drug Backers Look To Congress for Patent Law 
Reform, GENERIC LINE, Vol. 19, No. 21 (Nov. 8, 2002) (stating that the Senate passed the proposed 
bill in July of 2002). 
 102. Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001, H.R. 1862, 107th Cong. (2001). 
See Tighter Patent Rules May Also Boost Brand Approvals, THE FOOD AND DRUG LETTER, No. 667 
(Jan. 17, 2003) (stating that H.R. 1862 did not make it out of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee despite passing in the Senate). In response, “Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Charles 
Schumer (D-N.Y.) recently reintroduced [the] bill (S.54) that would restrict brand companies to one 
30-month stay on generic approval when a generic firm challenges a brand drug’s patent and the brand 
manufacturer files an infringement lawsuit.” Patent Expirations, Generic Biologics Face Industry in 
2003, GENERIC LINE, Vol. 20, No. 2, Jan. 31, 2003. 
 103. See Remarks by the President on Prescription Drugs, 2002 WL 31369474, *3 (Oct. 21, 
2002).  
 104. Drug Competition Act of 2002, S. 754, 107th Cong. (2002). The bill required that when a 
generic pharmaceutical company filed a Paragraph IV certification under the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
then entered into an “agreement” with the brand-name pharmaceutical company regarding the 
Paragraph IV certification, before the subject of the ANDA enters the market, the two parties must file 
the text of the agreement with the Assistant Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission. Id. 
at § 5. The bill defined “agreements” that must be filed as: 
(A) the manufacture, marketing or sale of the brand name drug that is the subject of the 
generic drug applicant’s ANDA; 
(B) the manufacture, marketing or sale of the generic drug that is the subject of the generic 
drug applicant’s ANDA; or 
(C) the 180-day period referred to in section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)) as it applies to such ANDA or to any other ANDA 
based on the same brand name drug. 
Id. at § 5(a)(2). The FTC supported S. 754, and incorporated the goals of the bill into its study on 
generic drug entry prior to patent expiration. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC 
Recommends Legislative Changes to Hatch-Waxman Act (Jul. 30, 2002), available at 
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In response to Congress’ failure to codify the FTC’s recommendations, 
the FDA proposed a new rule on October 24, 2002,106 which was backed 
by President Bush.107 This rule as proposed would have restricted the 
number of thirty-month stays a brand-name pharmaceutical company can 
obtain in response to a generic company’s Paragraph IV certification to 
one.108 The proposed rule also would have restricted the types of patents 
that could be listed in the Orange Book,109 as well as required companies 
to fill out more detailed declarations for listing.110 The FDA hoped these 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.htm. The bill’s sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy 
stated “[c]onsumers pay the price when drug makers collude to stifle competition and drive up the cost 
of prescription drugs . . . our bill discourages these sweetheart deals by ensuring that antitrust 
authorities can take quick and decisive action against these companies.” Senate Passes Leahy Bill 
Targeting Sweetheart Deals that Delay Low-Cost Generic Drugs, U.S. NEWSWIRE, National Desk 
Section, Nov. 20, 2002, at 1. 
 105. Drug Patent Reform Proposal Faces Uphill Battle in Congress, THE FOOD AND DRUG 
LETTER, Dec. 6, 2002, at 8. The last action taken on the bill was a pass by voice vote in the Senate. Id. 
“The bill isn’t expected to pass the House, but Leahy plans to reintroduce it next year, a Leahy 
representative said.” Id. 
 106. FDA Proposed Rule, supra note 36, at 65,448. 
 107. See Remarks by the President on Prescription Drugs, supra note 103. This issue had strong 
political overtones, as indicated by the comments of Senator Edward Kennedy, who stated, “[this 
regulatory proposal] is a down payment, but no substitute for the more comprehensive generic drugs 
legislation which passed the U.S. Senate only to die in the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives.” Bush Proposes Generic-Drug Regulations, ANTITRUST LITIGATION REPORTER, Nov. 
2002, at 17. 
 108. FDA Proposed Rule, supra note 36, at 65,448. “The proposal also would state that there will 
be only one opportunity for a 30-month stay in the approval date of each ANDA or 505(b)(2) 
application.” Id. 
 109. Id. at 65,451. The limitation applies to NDAs and amendments to NDAS. Id. Listable patents 
would be: 
drug substance (ingredient) patents, drug product (formulation and composition) patents, 
product by process patents, and method of use patents. Process patents, patents claiming 
packaging, patents claiming metabolites, and patents claiming intermediates are not covered 
by this section, and information on these patents may not be submitted to FDA. For patents 
that claim the drug substance, the applicant shall submit information only on those patents 
that claim the drug substance that is the subject of the pending or approved application or 
that claim a drug substance that is the same as the active ingredient that is the subject of the 
approved or pending application within the meaning of section 505(j)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act. For 
patents that claim a drug product, the applicant shall submit information only on those 
patents that claim a drug product that is the subject of a pending or approved application. 
For patents that claim a method of use, the applicant shall submit information only on those 
patents that claim indications or other conditions of use that are the subject of a pending or 
approved application. For approved applications, the applicant shall identify the indication 
or other condition of use in the approved labeling that corresponds to the listed patent and 
claim identified. 
Id. The italicized portion of the above quote indicates the new or revised language in this section of the 
proposed rule. The current regulation is codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b). Id. 
 110. Id. at 65,453–54.  
The proposed rule would . . . revise [21 C.F.R.] § 314.53(c)(1) and (c)(2) by rewording the 
general patent declaration requirement in paragraph (c)(1) and by replacing the existing, 
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changes would increase the number of challenges to the drug patents held 
by brand-name pharmaceutical companies,111 which is one of the goals of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.112 The FDA also hoped these changes would 
streamline the ANDA process by reducing the number of patent disputes 
that can lead to automatic thirty-month stays.113
E. Reactions to the FTC Study and the FDA Proposal 
Consumer groups and the generic pharmaceutical industry predictably 
supported the proposed FDA rules.114 The Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association issued a press release in support of the proposed changes,115 
claiming that the proposed rules would decrease the number of frivolous 
lawsuits and increase access to affordable medication.116 Likewise, the 
Business for Affordable Medicine organization117 stated that the rules were 
necessary to close loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act.118 However, 
FamiliesUSA119 argued that the rules were not stringent enough, as they 
general declaration at paragraph (c)(2)(i) with a more detailed declaration that would act as a 
“checklist” that would focus on patent claims and would ensure that applicants submit only 
appropriate patent information and stand behind the accuracy of that information. 
Id. at 65,453. The checklist, which is too lengthy to reproduce here, required the filer to explicitly fill 
in answers to specific questions so as to allow the FDA to more easily identify attempts to list 
inappropriate patents in the Orange Book. Id. at 65, 463-54. 
 111. Id. at 65,456. 
 112. See Gerald R. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug 
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999). 
 113. FDA Proposed Rule, supra note 36, at 65,449. 
 114. For a listing of links to websites containing writings in support of the proposed amendments, 
see The Hatch-Waxman Act and New Legislation to Close Its Loopholes, at http://www.cptech.org/ 
ip/health/generic/hw.html. 
 115. Press Release, Generic Pharmaceutical Association, GPhA Welcomes President’s 
Commitment to Issue Federal Regulation to Remove Barriers to Generic Competition (Oct. 21, 2002), 
at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=913120&TICK= GPHA&STORY=/ 
www/story/06-10-2003/0001963169&EDATE=Oct+21,+2002. The press release also states that even 
more than the $3.5 billion the proposed rule is expected to save could be saved if Congress takes 
stronger measures. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Business for Affordable Medicine describes itself as a “national coalition of employers, 
governors, and labor leaders.” Media Release, Business for Affordable Medicine, Employers, 
Governors Applaud White House Prescription Drug Initiative: Regulatory Action Is Important First 
Step to Save Purchasers Billions of Dollars (Oct. 21, 2002), at http://www.bamcoalition.org/ 
Press/10.21.02PressRelease.pdf. 
 118. Id. South Dakota Governor Bill Janklow stated “[o]ur job now will be to ensure this 
important action brings an immediate end to abusive pharmaceutical industry practices.” Id. 
 119. FamiliesUSA describes itself as a “nonprofit and nonpartisan [organization that] advocates 
for high-quality, affordable health care for all Americans.” FamiliesUSA, “Administration’s Generic 
Drug Rule Provides Weak, Diluted Relief for America’s Consumers,” formerly available at 
http://www.familiesusa.org/1021Bushproposedrxrule.htm (on file with author). 
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did not sufficiently prohibit brand-name pharmaceutical companies from 
preventing generic pharmaceutical products from entering the market.120 In 
addition, the tactics employed by brand-name drug manufacturers drew the 
attention of state attorneys general and plaintiffs’ attorneys, many of 
whom viewed the brand-name drug manufactures as “the next tobacco.”121 
They felt that growing public support for decreasing pharmaceutical costs, 
combined with some of the marginally legal tactics used by brand-name 
drug manufacturers,122 would compel courts to rule against brand-name 
companies and award huge punitive damages, similar to those handed 
down in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s.123
Conversely, the brand-name pharmaceutical industry and other groups 
weighed in against the proposed rule changes.124 Included in this group 
was PhRMA,125 which stated that the proposed rules would stifle 
innovation and result in fewer drugs being developed in the future.126 
These groups also stated that the American patent system produced the 
 120. Id. 
 121. Terry Carter, Drug Wars: Coalition Tactics Make Price Fight Look Like Battle Over 
Tobacco, 88 A.B.A.J. 40, 41 (Dec. 2002). Lobbyist and tort-reform lawyer Victor Schwartz indicates 
that drug companies are “up against an ‘iron triangle’ of bad publicity, lobbying efforts, and 
litigation.” Id. at 43. These factors coalesce to put brand name drug manufacturers on the defensive, 
forcing them to justify the high prices they charge for patented drugs. Id. The article indicates this is an 
especially difficult task now, as a combination of a sagging economy, an aging population with great 
political clout, and corporations and insurance companies seeking lower health-care costs are banding 
together in an attempt to restrict the ability of brand-name companies to recoup their research and 
development costs through high prices on patented drug products. Id. at 41-45. The brand-name 
industry’s response has thus far consisted mainly of public relations initiatives to educate the public of 
the need for incentives to encourage innovation. Id. at 43. However, drug price reform is becoming 
increasingly attractive to politicians who hope to cater to segments of the population that vote in large 
numbers, especially seniors. Id. at 43-44. As such, brand-name drug manufacturers face a difficult task 
in attempting to stave off amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act that will give generic companies 
more access to the pharmaceutical market, thereby lowering prices and the profits enjoyed by brand-
name drug manufacturers. Id. at 40-45. 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 44. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Efforts to Alter Balance of Hatch-
Waxman Law Based on Faulty Premises [hereinafter PhRMA Backgrounder] (Jan. 2002), at 
http://www.allhealth.org/recent/audio_06-13-02/hatchwaxman-backgrounder.pdf. 
 125. PhRMA’s mission statement states:  
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) represents the 
country’s leading research-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, which are 
devoted to inventing medicines that allow patients to live longer, healthier, and more 
productive lives. The industry invested more than $30 billion in 2001 in discovering and 
developing new medicines. PhRMA companies are leading the way in the search for new 
cures.  
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Mission Statement, at 
http://www.phrma.org/whoweare/. 
 126. See PhRMA Backgrounder, supra note 124. 
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most successful and useful drug companies in the world127 as a result of 
the strong patent protection afforded to innovators under the American 
system.128 These groups claim that future innovation depends on strong 
pharmaceutical patent protections129 and that the promise of strong returns 
on research and development investments facilitates new drug discoveries. 
They say new drug discoveries actually save money in the long run.130 
Thus, they claim that rules which would weaken brand-name 
pharmaceutical makers’ abilities to make a strong profit on new 
pharmaceutical products will curtail pharmaceutical innovations,131 
because the process of new drug discovery and approval is so expensive 
and time-consuming.132 Regulations that inhibit brand-name companies 
from recouping the development costs and making a profit will reduce the 
incentive to continue developing new drugs, resulting in fewer new drugs 
in the future—a situation that will hurt consumers in the long run.133
F. The FDA’s 2003 Hatch-Waxman Act Regulation 
On June 18, 2003, the FDA released its final rule134 in response to the 
FTC Study135 and comments136 on the proposed rule.137 This final rule 
 127. Update: Bush to Close Hatch-Waxman Loopholes, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, supra note 9, 
at 1 (quoting remarks delivered by President Bush on Oct. 24, 2002). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. PhRMA Backgrounder, supra note 124. “Groundbreaking research shows that new 
medicines lead to higher prescription drug costs but significantly lower total health spending. . . . [A] 
study found that an $18 increase in money spent on new prescription drug expenditures reduces non-
drug spending by $71.09, resulting in a net savings of $53.09.” Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Update: Bush to Close Hatch-Waxman Loopholes, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, supra note 9, 
at 1 (stating that it can cost up to $800 million to develop and bring a new drug to market).  
 133. PhRMA Backgrounder, supra note 124. “All of this means that changing the Hatch-Waxman 
balance will lead to fewer new medicines. This will mean lost opportunities to cure disease, promote 
more productive lives, and save money.” Id. See also Hatch-Waxman Has Boosted Generics, But Jury 
Still Out on Effects On Innovators, PHARMA MARKETLETTER 1 (Jan. 6, 2003) (quoting Gregory Glover 
of Ropes & Gray, a law firm, who stated “innovation . . . will be harder in the future because the easy 
fruit has been picked off and the diseases now being investigated involve harder science and more 
sophisticated problems[; thus,] [f]ailures will be more costly . . . and innovation is unlikely to continue 
at the same pace as previously”). 
 134. 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). The effective date of the new rule was August 18, 2003, and the compliance date 
for the submission of information on polymorph patents was December 18, 2003. Id. See also infra 
note 139 and accompanying text. 
 135. FTC Study, supra note 15. 
 136. For a listing of and links to comments received by the FDA in this matter, see 02N-0417 
Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ 
dockets/02n0417/02n0417.htm. 
 137. FDA Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,440 (proposed Oct. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 21 
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affects five aspects of the FDA’s Hatch-Waxman implementation 
regulations.138 First, the rule clarifies which patents must be submitted for 
listing in the Orange Book and which patents must not.139 Next, the final 
rule modifies the pre-existing regulation to ensure that only one thirty-
month stay is allowed per ANDA or 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) application 
(referred to in the final rule as a “505(b)(2) application” in reference to the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act section).140 Additionally, the final rule 
changes the patent declaration forms that must be submitted by an entity 
submitting or holding an NDA.141 The new rule also “modifies the 
statement used to describe the fact that the NDA applicant or holder 
believes there are no relevant patents to be submitted.”142 Finally, the final 
rule comports with the proposed rule in that it does not affect the 180-day 
exclusivity period enjoyed by the first ANDA holder.143
The FDA estimates that the net economic benefit of this regulation will 
exceed $2 billion over a ten-year period.144 Somewhat surprisingly, the 
C.F.R. pt. 314). 
 138. See 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,697. 
 139. Id. This aspect of the final rule changes 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b). Id. Under the new regulation, 
the NDA holder must submit patents that claim the “drug substance (active ingredient), [t]he drug 
product (formulation and composition), and [a] method of use.” Id. Additionally, patents that claim a 
polymorph of the active ingredient of the drug substance described in the NDA “must be submitted if 
the applicant has test data demonstrating that a drug product containing the polymorph will perform 
the same as the drug product described in the NDA.” Id. Next, method of use patents must only be 
submitted if they “claim indications or other conditions of use that are the subject of a pending or 
approved application.” Id. Finally, “information one patents claiming packaging, patents claiming 
metabolites, and patents claiming intermediates must not be submitted.” Id. 
 140. Id. The regulation “modifies §§ 314.95(a) and 314.52(a) to state that, if an ANDA or 
505(b)(2) [21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)] application is amended to include a paragraph IV certification, 
notice must be provided to the NDA holder and patent owner only if the application did not already 
contain a paragraph IV certification or there was not a full opportunity for a 30-month stay.” Id. This 
change ensures that there is only one opportunity for a thirty-month stay per ANDA or 505(b)(2) 
application, since “[n]otice to the NDA holder and patent owner is one of the requirements for a 30-
month stay . . . .” Id. at 36,688. 
 141. Id. at 36,697. This change affects 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(1) and (c)(2)(ii). Id. This change is 
notable because of the adoption of more specific attestation statements that must be signed by the 
applicant. Id. at 36,686. A warning is also included that informs “the submitter that a willfully and 
knowingly false statement is a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. 1001.” Id.  
 142. Id. at 36,697. This aspect of the regulation affects 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(3). Id. 
 143. Id. at 36,695. “[E]ligibility for 180-day exclusivity will follow the same general principles as 
before implementation of this final rule. . . . We are not altering our interpretation of exclusivity in the 
final rule.” Id. 
 144. Id. at 36,703.  
We estimate the 10-year cost of this final rule to be $51.584 billion and the annualized cost to 
be $4.871 billion. The 10-year benefit of this final rule is estimated to be $53.940 billion and 
the annualized benefit is $5.093 billion . . . . Thus, the 10-year net benefit is $2.356 billion 
and the annualized net benefit is $ 222 million.  
Id. 
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new regulation has initially enjoyed only lukewarm support from the 
generic drug industry.145 The generic industry would prefer legislation 
over the final FDA regulation, and it may get its wish; two bills introduced 
in 2003 would amend the Hatch-Waxman Act as a part of Medicare 
reform.146 While the full implications of these bills are beyond the scope of 
this Note, those sections of the bills that would affect the Hatch-Waxman 
Act have been described as “complementary” to the FDA’s final rule.147 
Many brand-name pharmaceutical companies believe that the new 
regulation goes too far in favor of generic drug companies.148  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Statutory Framework 
The 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act149 were an 
important step in American medicine, as they ensured that new drugs 
placed on the market were safe and effective150 while retaining the 
 145. See Press Release, Generic Pharmaceutical Association, Pending Hatch-Waxman Legislation 
Coupled With FDA Rule Will Achieve Meaningful Savings for American Consumers (Aug. 15, 2003), 
at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT= 913120&TICK=GPHA&STORY=/ 
www/story/08-15-2003/0002001805&EDATE=Aug+15,+2003 (stating “more measures outside of 
FDA’s authority are necessary if consumers and healthcare purchasers are to have meaningful relief 
from unsustainable prescription drug costs.”). See also Final Patent Rule Brings Significant Changes 
to Brand, Generic Competition, FOOD AND DRUG LETTER, Aug. 1, 2003, at 680 (stating “[o]n first 
blush, the two key pharmaceutical trade groups [GPhA and PhRMA] offered tepid support of the 
rule”). 
 146. Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, S. 1, 108th Congress (2003); 
Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Congress (2003). 
According to Dan Troy, FDA Chief Counsel for Food and Drugs, “We are pleased that both versions 
of this legislation include key ideas embodied in FDA’s regulation to improve access to generic drugs, 
and do not include certain other problematic provisions contained in legislation (S. 812) that passed 
the Senate last year.” Promoting Availability of Lower Cost Generic Drugs: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Senate Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Dan Troy, Chief Counsel for Food 
and Drugs, Food and Drug Administration). S. 1. also “would eliminate the 180 days of exclusivity for 
any generic drug company that enters such anticompetitive deals or fails to come to market in a timely 
manner.” Generic Rx: Schumer Criticizes DOJ Concerns About Measure, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, 
Aug. 4, 2003, at Politics & Policy. Cf. supra note 100. 
 147. U.S. FDA Generic Drug Access Reg Takes Effect, PHRMA MARKETLETTER, Aug. 11, 2003 
(stating “[t]he FDA says it is pleased the generic legislation passed by the House and the Senate and 
included in the Medicare legislation, S 1 and HR 1, complements the Final Rule”).  
 148. See, e.g., FDA Patent Rule Closes Most, Not All, Loopholes, Troy Says, GENERIC LINE, VOL. 
20, NO. 13, July 16, 2003 (“Bruce Kuhlik, senior vice president and general counsel of PhRMA, told 
senators in Judiciary Committee the current law ‘has been an enormous boon to the generic industry.’ 
He cautioned that any changes to the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act could undermine incentives for 
pharmaceutical innovation.”). 
 149. 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 
(1962). 
 150. FTC Study (July 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/ genericdrugstudy.pdf. 
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financial incentives that compelled pharmaceutical researchers to create 
new and more powerful drugs.151 However, these amendments also created 
a system where brand-name pharmaceutical companies enjoyed what 
amounted to a perpetual monopoly on their products.152 This situation 
resulted in a pharmaceutical market with very few inexpensive, generic 
products,153 which meant that pharmaceutical prices stayed high even after 
the patents on the original pharmaceuticals had expired.154 The Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984 effectively ended these perpetual monopolies by 
streamlining the process by which generic drugs could be introduced into 
the market.155  
Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic pharmaceutical 
companies have flourished.156 This success is due, in large part, to the 
incentives Hatch-Waxman gives to generic companies to challenge157 and 
“design around”158 the existing patents held by brand-name 
pharmaceutical producers. Despite its successes, however, the Hatch-
Waxman provisions that allow for an automatic thirty-month stay on the 
approval of the generic’s ANDA, if the brand-name company files suit for 
infringing a patent listed in the Orange Book,159 have been particularly 
prone to abuse by brand-name drug manufacturers.160 The thirty-month 
stay extends the brand-name drug manufacturers’s intellectual property 
rights,161 as it is, in effect, an “automatic injunction.”162 The provision 
allows for a stay longer than the average time it takes for the FDA to 
acknowledge the bioequivalence163 between the generic product and the 
 151. Id. at 4. 
 152. Id. “By 1984, the FDA estimated that there were approximately 150 brand-name drugs whose 
patents had expired for which there was no generic equivalent.” Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, Part 
I at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649). 
 153. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 10. “According to the FDA, from the time Hatch-Waxman 
became effective in 1984 through December 31, 2000, 8,019 ANDAs were filed with the FDA.” Id. 
See also Boersig, Patent Woes for Big Pharma,supra note 10. Jeff Trewitt, spokesman for PhRMA, 
states, “Since [Hatch-Waxman] passed 18 years ago, about 8,000 generic drugs have been approved to 
go onto the market, the portion of the marketplace that is generic has increased dramatically from 19% 
to about 49%, and is still growing.” Id. 
 157. See Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
 158. FTC Comments at 17, available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030002.pdf. 
 159. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000). 
 160. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 40. 
 161. “The 30-month stay provision of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments protects brand-name 
companies beyond their existing intellectual property rights.” FTC Study, supra note 15, at 39. 
 162. Bill Aims to Speed Market Entry of Generics, CHAIN DRUG REVIEW, NO.4, Vol. 24, Feb. 18, 
2002, at pg. RX7, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Chain Drug Review file. 
 163. See supra note 52. 
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brand-name product.164 Thirty months is also longer than the average time 
it takes for a district court to rule on the issues of patent infringement165 
and patent invalidity.166
B. The FDA’s Final Rule Will Greatly Reduce Abuses of the Thirty-Month 
Stay Provision 
Brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers have been able to extend 
the length of the stay to up to sixty-five months by listing additional 
patents in the Orange Book.167 When a generic drug manufacturer 
challenges the patent that covers a brand-name pharmaceutical product by 
filing a paragraph IV certification in conjunction with an ANDA,168 the 
patent holder has forty-five days to file suit for patent infringement.169 At 
this point, the automatic thirty-month stay on the generic’s entrance into 
the market begins to run.170 However, before the new FDA regulation, the 
brand name drug manufacturers could have then listed another patent in 
the Orange Book,171 forcing the generic company to file another paragraph 
IV certification.172 If the brand-name company then filed suit on this 
second certification within forty-five days of receiving notice, another 
thirty-month stay was automatically effective.173 Thus, by manipulating 
the Orange Book, a brand-name company could extend the generic 
approval process for a much longer time than contemplated by the Hatch-
Waxman Act.174  
 164. “FDA approval of generic applicants that filed paragraph IV certifications and were not sued 
took, on average, 25 months and 15 days from the filing date.” FTC Study, supra note 15, at 39. 
 165. Id. “On average, the time between the complaint and a district court decision in litigation 
between a brand-name company and first or second generic applicants was 25 months and 13 days. 
The average time between the complaint and an appellate decision was 37 months and 20 days.” Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 49 (Table 4-3). 
 168. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). 
 169. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2000). 
 170. Id. 
 171. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 40. “[B]y the timely listing of additional patents in the Orange 
Book after a generic applicant has filed its ANDA (later-issued patents), brand-name companies can 
obtain additional 30-month stays of FDA approval of the generic applicant’s ANDA.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
 172. Id. “Although the generic applicant has already certified to the patents previously listed in the 
Orange Book for a particular drug product, it must re-certify to the newly listed patent(s) and notify 
the brand-name company of its re-certification.” Id. 
 173. Id. “If the brand-name company sues for patent infringement on the new certification within 
45 days of notification, a new 30-month stay will begin to run. The FDA is prohibited from approving 
the ANDA until the new 30-month stay expires.” Id. 
 174. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1) (2000). 
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The FDA regulation comports with the time-frame contemplated by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act175 by allowing only one thirty-month stay on the 
approval of the generic product for each brand-name pharmaceutical, 
while avoiding the possibility of manipulation by ANDA filers seeking to 
avoid any 30-month stay.176 The new rule also eliminates the previous 
incentive for brand name drug manufacturers to abuse the Orange Book 
requirement by listing additional patents that are sometimes marginally 
related to the actual pharmaceutical.177 This aspect of the proposed 
regulation also eliminates the incentive for brand-name companies to 
prolong patent litigation unnecessarily, because the generic drug 
manufacturers would legally be able to market its product after the thirty-
month stay regardless of the posture of the ongoing patent litigation with 
the brand name drug manufacturers.178
C. The FDA Proposal Reduces Improper Orange Book Listings 
The new regulation also cuts down on Orange Book abuse by further 
restricting the types of patents that may be listed in the Orange Book.179 
 175. See 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,692–93 (June 18, 2003) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (indicating that the FDA believes that the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
drafters intended there to be one, but only one, thirty-month stay per ANDA application). 
 176. Id. at 36,693. 
Our revised interpretation of section 505(j)(2)(B)(iii) of the [Food, Drug and Cosmetics] act 
accomplishes two statutory objectives: (1) It closes a possible loophole that would have 
allowed ANDA applicants to avoid any 30-month stay and (2) it prevents multiple 30-month 
stays per ANDA application. A similar conclusion applies to the parallel provisions of section 
505(b)(2) of the act. 
 177. FTC Study, supra note 15, at v. “To permit only one 30-month stay per drug product per 
ANDA should eliminate most of the potential for improper Orange Book listings to generate 
unwarranted 30-month stays.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 178. Id. at 7. “Filing of the lawsuit stays the FDA’s approval of the ANDA until the earliest of: (1) 
the date the patent(s) expire; (2) a final determination of non-infringement or patent invalidity by a 
court in the patent litigation; or (3) the expiration of 30 months form the receipt of notice of the 
paragraph IV certification.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. See also FTC Comments, at 10 available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030002.pdf. The FTC agreed with the FDA’s proposed rule that “[p]atents 
claiming packaging, metabolites, and intermediates do not meet the listing requirements and, therefore, 
should not be listed in the Orange Book.” Id. However, the FTC also indicated that the final form of 
the FDA rule should be refined to clarify that “claims reciting a known product and a novel process 
that are drafted in the product-by-process format” cannot be listed. Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). 
Additionally, the FTC indicated in its comments on the FDA’s proposed rule that the proposed rule 
was incorrect in allowing NDA filers to list claims reciting polymorphs. Id. at 13-14. “Patents claiming 
a chemical compound (sic) that differ by water-of-hydration or that form a crystalline structure 
different from the active ingredient are referred to as ‘polymorphs.’” Id. at 13 n.50. Furthermore, the 
FTC suggested that the FDA tweak its proposed amendment to 21 C.F.R. § 314.53, the patent 
declaration regulation regarding the Orange Book. Id. at 13. The FTC suggested the following 
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This aspect is not redundant in light of the single thirty-month stay 
provision, as there is the possibility that fraudulent Orange Book listings 
could delay the generic approval process without lengthening the 
automatic thirty-month stay.180 For instance, a brand name drug 
manufacturer could learn that a generic drug manufacturer is planning on 
filing a paragraph IV ANDA on one of its products, or assume this will 
happen because the brand-name company sees the patent as being weak.181 
In response, the brand name drug manufacturer would likely file 
additional, stronger patents in the Orange Book.182 By filing patents that 
are stronger but marginally related to the actual pharmaceutical product, 
the brand name drug manufacturers could discourage the generic 
manufacturer from filing the ANDA because of the generic manufacturer’s 
belief that it would be unable to win a noninfringement or invalidity 
decision at trial.183 The extra Orange Book-listed patents could also ensure 
that any litigation would take longer than the thirty-month stay, thereby 
practically ensuring that the brand-name company would have the full 
benefit of the stay provisions.184  
additions to ensure that the FDA can more easily identify Orange Book declarations regarding patents 
that should not be listed:  
First, the certification should require that the person attesting to the certification is either 
senior patent counsel with the NDA holder or an outside patent counsel specifically 
designated to act as the NDA holder’s agent. . . . Second, the FDA may wish to consider 
adding a knowledge requirement to the certification. . . . Third, the FDA should consider 
adding two additional declarations on patents with product-by-process claims and terminal 
disclaimers.  
Id. at 19. The final rule comports with the FTC comment in that it does not allow patents claiming 
packaging, metabolites, or intermediates to be listed. 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 36,697. The final regulation also alters the declaration requirements to ensure that only true 
product-by-process patents are submitted. Id. at 36,686. The final regulation also changes the 
attestation requirements, although the final attestation requirements are not as specific as those called 
for by the FTC Comment. See Id. Lastly, the final rule allows polymorph patents to be listed, although 
it requires accompanying test data that shows bioequivalence. See supra note 139 and accompanying 
text. 
 180. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 41. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Table 4-1 of the FTC Study indicates that the average length of patent litigation cases in 
district courts that arise in response to a paragraph IV certification is 25 months and 13 days. FTC 
Study, supra note 15, at 47. By listing more patents in the Orange Book for a particular drug product, 
the brand-name company would introduce more issues to a trial and thereby lengthen the time required 
for a trial court decision on the questions of validity and infringement. Id. at 47-48. 
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D. 180-Day Exclusivity Period Abuse Is Correctable by the FTC 
The FTC recommended that parties be required to report certain 
settlement agreements to the FTC.185 If a brand name drug manufacturer 
files an infringement suit against the first paragraph IV ANDA filer, and 
the parties reach a settlement whereby the generic drug manufacturer 
agrees not to market its version of the drug, then the 180-day period will 
not begin to run.186 The FTC did not find any actual incidents where an 
agreement between a brand name drug manufacturer and a generic drug 
manufacturer resulted in the 180-day exclusivity period being “parked.”187 
Such an agreement would have the effect of precluding subsequent generic 
entrants from entering the market for the product produced by the brand 
name drug manufacturer.188  
Although such settlement agreements involve pharmaceutical approval 
and patent issues, those agreements could also be dealt with by antitrust 
laws.189 As such, the FTC would have authority to investigate such 
agreements,190 and sanction the involved parties based on its antitrust 
 185. FTC Study, supra note 15, at vi. “Recommendation 2: Pass legislation to require brand-name 
companies and first generic applicants to provide copies of certain agreements to the Federal Trade 
Commission.” Id. 
 186. Scott P. Perlman & Jay S. Brown, FTC Targets Patent Settlement Agreements, NAT’L L. J. 
(Nov. 11, 2002) at C1 (“As the FDA has noted, if the gains to the brand-name manufacturer from 
delaying generic entry exceed the potential gains to the generic entrant from 180-days of exclusivity, 
the parties will have incentives the share that incremental gain by postponing the 180-day period . . . . 
[A] settlement under which the generic company agrees not to market its products would extend the 
180-day period indefinitely”) (emphasis added). 
 187. “14 of the 20 of the [sic] settlement agreements obtained through the study, at the time they 
were executed, had the potential to ‘park’ the first generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity for some 
period of time, thus preventing FDA approval of any subsequent eligible applicants.” FTC Study, 
supra note 15, at 63. However, in a footnote to its study, the FTC states, “[w]hether FDA was actually 
prevented from approving subsequent eligible generic applicants depends on a number of factors, 
including whether there were subsequent generic applicant(s) and the result of any patent litigation 
with those applicants.” FTC Study, supra note 15, at 63 n.26. 
 188. Id. at 63. 
 189. Id. at 57 
The [FTC’s] antitrust law enforcement actions have alleged that certain brand-name and 
generic companies have entered into agreements that, among other things, have had the effect 
of delaying entry by the first generic that otherwise would trigger the running of the 180-day 
exclusivity, thereby creating a bottleneck for any subsequent eligible generic entry.  
Id. at 57 (footnote omitted). 
 190. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2003). The Senate bill “would eliminate the 180 days of exclusivity for any 
generic drug company that enters such anticompetitive deals or fails to come to market in a timely 
manner.” Generic Rx: Schumer Criticizes DOJ Concerns About Measure, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, 
Aug. 4, 2003, at Politics & Policy. “Robert Armitage, senior vice president and general counsel for Eli 
Lilly, said lawmakers should eliminate the measure concerning the 180-day exclusivity cause, saying it 
could lead to market ‘monopoly’ by one generic drug maker.” Id. 
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enforcement authority.191 The final regulation promulgated by the FDA 
does not address the 180-day exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.192
IV. PROPOSAL 
Congress should codify legislation similar to the rules promulgated by 
the FDA193 in response to the recommendations made by the FTC.194 
Although the FDA rules will likely be effective, the FDA’s power to 
promulgate such rules is questionable.195 Additionally, statutory violations, 
as opposed to rule violations, would be tried in courts rather than in 
administrative settings, which would make the process more accessible to 
the public.196  
A. Only One Thirty-Month Stay Should Be Available 
The automatic thirty-month stay of a generic’s paragraph IV ANDA 
extends the brand name drug manufacturer’s intellectual property rights.197 
In a paragraph IV certification, the generic manufacturer proposes that the 
brand name drug manufacturer’s patent is either invalid or would not be 
infringed by the generic product.198 Thus, absent the automatic thirty-
month stay, the generic manufacturer could take a calculated risk and 
begin marketing its product before a court decision regarding the brand-
 191. Id. See also Elizabeth Stanley, An Ounce of Prevention: Analysis of Drug Patent Settlements 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, GEO. MASON L. REV. 345, 348-50 (2002). 
 192. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 193. 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).  
 194. See FTC Study, supra note 15. 
 195. Steve Seidenberg, Rule On Generics Faces Hurdles, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 11, 2002, at C1. While 
adoption of the proposed rules by the FDA benefits consumers by making generic drugs more 
available, the legal hurdles that the regulations will have to get past are much more extensive than 
those for legislation. Id. at C1 & C4. According to Marc Scheineson, a former FDA official, it is 
unclear whether the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the FDA the right to limit the automatic stay to one time 
only. Id. at C3. Before the adoption of the proposed, some predicted a lengthy court battle would likely 
ensue if the FDA adopted the proposed regulations. See Id. A better route than the adoption of 
administrative rules would be for Congress to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to integrate the proposed 
changes directly into it. This is the approach favored by Senator John McCain, who stated: “What is 
truly needed is legislation that will codify into law provisions that will guarantee that these drugs are 
affordable for those who need them.” Congress Plans Hearings on Access to Generic Drugs, GENERIC 
LINE, Vol. 19, No. 23 (Dec. 6, 2002). 
 196. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 530–31 (4th ed. 2002) 
(describing the differences in procedural requirements between judicial proceedings and informal 
agency adjudication, which is the type of adjudication most commonly used by agencies).  
 197. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 39. 
 198. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000). 
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name producer’s patent. If this occured, and the brand-name producer lost 
at trial, it would have lost out on the monopoly profits it could have 
charged during the trial.199 Hatch-Waxman prevents the generic drug 
manufacturers from taking this course of action.200 Thus, the thirty-month 
stay exclusively benefits the brand-name producer.201 The thirty-month 
stay provision of Hatch-Waxman202 gives the FDA enough time to 
determine the bioequivalence203 between the brand-name and generic 
products204 and gives the courts enough time to decide on the merits of the 
nearly inevitable patent infringement suit filed in response to a paragraph 
IV certification.205 Allowing brand-name companies to extend the stay 
beyond thirty months in order to protect their monopolies does not 
comport with the Hatch-Waxman Act’s goals.206 There is no compelling 
reason to allow multiple thirty-month stays, and the only reason to attempt 
to acquire a longer stay is to keep the generic product off the market.207 
The issue of whether a generic product should or should not be available 
on the market is best left to the courts and the FDA and should not be 
contingent upon a company’s adeptness at “creative compliance.”208 
Because the Hatch-Waxman Act contemplates that these decisions should 
be completed within thirty months of the infringement suit,209 the stay 
should be limited to this amount of time. 
B. The Changes to the Orange Book Listing Requirements and the 
Listability Declaration Requirement Comport with Hatch-Waxman 
The new FDA regulation210 regarding the clarification of standards for 
Orange Book listings will benefit consumers by reducing spurious patent 
 199. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 7. 
 200. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2000). See also FTC Study, supra note 15, at 7 (“A 30-month stay 
of FDA approval of an ANDA applicant is invoked when a brand-name company receives notice of a 
generic applicant’s paragraph IV certification and files suit for patent infringement within 45 days of 
that notice.”). 
 201. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 7.  
 202. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
 203. See supra note 52. 
 204. Id. at 39. “One 30-month period to resolve disputes over patents listed in the Orange Book 
prior to the ANDA’s filing date appears unlikely to delay generic entry, however, because it 
historically has approximated the time necessary for FDA review and approval of the ANDA and the 
duration of a patent lawsuit.” Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 40. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 36, 676, 36,688 (June 18, 2003). 
 209. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 39. 
 210. 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676. 
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litigation over patents listed in the Orange Book that are only marginally 
related to the drug product.211 The purpose of the Orange Book is to 
provide a central location for the listing of pharmaceutical patents.212 The 
stricter requirements for Orange Book listing should be accompanied by 
an FDA commitment to more closely scrutinize the legitimacy of Orange 
Book listings.213 Such scrutiny is a job better suited to the FDA than to the 
courts.214 FDA scrutiny of Orange Book listings would lead to greater 
consistency than judicial scrutiny of the listings, because the FDA is the 
entity that rules on the bioequivalence of generic products, which in turn 
challenge the products protected by the patents listed in the Orange 
Book.215  
While this proposal makes theoretical sense, it is important to 
remember the practical restraints on its implementation imposed by the 
FDA’s budget.216 Thus, unless the FDA’s budget is enlarged to 
accommodate such expanded authority, a more cost-effective measure 
would be to create a private cause of action by which generic companies 
could sue brand-name companies for improperly listing patents in the 
Orange Book. By creating this cause of action, Congress could also 
implement penalties against companies that improperly list patents, such 
as fines or loss of patent rights under a patent misuse theory.217
 211. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 212. “One function of the Orange Book is to provide notice to ANDA applicants of relevant 
patents.” FTC Study, supra note 15, at 54. 
 213. The FDA, unfortunately, continues to refuse to provide an administrative process to review 
the listability of Orange Book patents. 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,683. 
“An administrative process for reviewing patents, assessing patent challenges, and de-listing patents 
would involve patent law issues that are outside both our expertise and our authority.” Id. 
 214. Sarah Yoho, Note, Reformation of the Hatch-Wasman Act, An Unnecessary Resolution, 27 
NOVA L. REV. 527, 550–51 (2003).  
 215. An ANDA must demonstrate that the generic product is the bioequivalent of the brand-name 
product, and must make a certification regarding each Orange Book patent that is related to the 
relevant NDA. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 5. Implicit in this is that the FDA is the final determinee 
of whether a generic is the bioequivalent of a brand-name drug. Because the FDA reviews NDAs and 
bioequivalence claims, it holds greater familiarity with the drugs and patents at issue than courts, and 
thus is theoretically better-equipped to review listability issues than the courts. 
 216. Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate and impractical for us to create regulatory 
mechanisms for reviewing patent listings or permitting third parties to submit patents for listing. We 
lack both the resources and the expertise to resolve such matters.” 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman 
Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,683 (emphasis added). See also Abbreviated New Drug Application 
Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28873-4 (July 10, 1989); FTC Study, supra note 15, at 41.  
 217. But see Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that 
parties do not have a private right of action to delist patents from the Orange Book). 
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C. Abuses of the 180-Day Exclusivity Provision Should Continue to Be 
Dealt with by the FTC’s Antitrust Division. 
Finally, no changes should be made to the 180-day marketing 
exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.218 Even though these 
provisions have the potential to preclude subsequent generic entrants from 
entering the market,219 the FTC study found no evidence that such 
agreements have ever been adopted.220 Also, these provisions provide 
incentives for generic companies to challenge the validity of221 and design 
around222 the patents held by brand-name companies, resulting in 
increased competition between drug companies and thereby lowering the 
prices of pharmaceutical products.223  
Instead of amending the 180-day exclusivity provisions, preventing 
agreements that would park the marketing exclusivity period would be 
better accomplished by the FTC in its antitrust enforcement capacity.224 
 218. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 219. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 57. “If the 180-day exclusivity for the first generic applicant 
does not run, then the FDA may not approve any subsequent eligible generic applicants. Thus, if the 
first generic applicant agrees not to trigger the 180-day exclusivity, the possibility exists that no 
generic applicant may enter the market.” Id.  
 220. Id. at 63 n.26. 
 221. “The grant of the 180-day exclusivity to the first generic applicant creates an incentive for a 
generic company to challenge a brand-name company’s drug product patents.” FTC Study, supra note 
15, at 57. See also Mova v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 222. FTC Comments, supra note 27, at 17. 
 223. “The CBO estimated that, in 1994, the availability of generic drugs saved purchasers between 
$8 billion and $10 billion.” FTC Study, supra note 14, at 9 (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 
How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry at 28 (July 1998)). 
 224. See Scott P. Perlman & Jay S. Brown, FTC Targets Patent Settlement Agreements, NAT’L 
L.J., Nov. 11, 2002, at C1. The FTC has recently been involved in four cases involving agreements 
between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies that the agency viewed as anticompetitive 
agreements. In Abbott Labs., 65 Fed. Reg. 17,502 (Apr. 3, 2000), Abbott agreed to pay a generic 
entrant $4.5 million per month to keep a generic version of Hytrin off the market while a district court 
judge decided its case. The FTC opposed this agreement because, first, it was viewed as an 
impermissible non-compete agreement, and, second, the agreement prohibited other generic entrants 
from entering the market because it kept the 180-day period of exclusivity for the first generic entrant 
from beginning to toll while the payments were being made and while the generic company was not 
marketing its product. Id. at 17,504. The FTC obtained a consent decree from the two companies 
whereby the agreement was nullified. Id. at 17,503. The FTC obtained a similar consent decree in a 
case involving facts similar to those in Abbott Labs. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 
18,636 (Apr. 10, 2001). The agreement in that case involved quarterly payments of $10 million to the 
generic company in return for keeping its generic product off the market. Id. at 18,637. In Biovail 
Corp., 67 Fed. Reg. 44,606 (July 3, 2002), the FTC obtained a consent decree nullifying an agreement 
between two generic manufacturers not to compete with each other, effectively allowing the two to 
split the profits from the 180-day period exclusivity period. Id. However, the FTC failed to prevail in 
Schering-Plough Corp., 2002 FTC Lexis 40 (June 27, 2002). In that case, the FTC failed to prove that 
Schering-Plough had enough market share to violate per se the Sherman Act. Id. at 279. The FTC also 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p829 Robinson book pages.doc2/6/2004   2:52 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
856 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:829 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreements between a brand name drug manufacturer and a generic drug 
manufacturer to park the exclusivity period would have the effect of 
preventing other competitors from entering the market.225 Such agreements 
could reasonably be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.226 
Legislation similar to that passed by the Senate in 2002227 requiring parties 
to report certain settlement agreements228 to the FTC would facilitate 
antitrust enforcement, and thus should be passed by Congress.229 The 
threat of FTC enforcement of the antitrust laws in response to these types 
of agreements is likely to be a disincentive for companies to enter into 
them.230  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Hatch-Waxman Act231 significantly changed the pharmaceutical 
industry232 by encouraging generic drug manufacturers to challenge and 
design around patents held by brand name drug manufacturers,233 leading 
to a huge increase in the availability of low-cost generic alternatives to 
was unable to prove that the licensing agreement between the two companies was a sham, or that the 
agreement delayed generic entry into the market. Id. These cases indicate that the FTC believes that it 
has the authority to prohibit drug companies from exploiting the 180-day period of exclusivity for the 
first generic entrant through its enforcement of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act. More 
recently, the Chairman of the FTC, Timothy Muris, has indicated that the FTC will continue to target 
agreements that seek to park the 180-day exclusivity period granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act. FTC 
Chief Promises More Scrutiny over Drugs, GENERIC LINE, Vol. 19, No. 22 (Nov. 22, 2002). However, 
recent legislation would change the statutory landscape in this regard, and thus possibly affect the 
FTC’s ability to pursue these types of cases. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 226. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2000). 
 227. Drug Competition Act of 2002, S. 754, 107th Cong. § 5 (2002). For a discussion of the 
provisions of this bill, which was not passed by the House of Representatives, see supra note 104. 
 228. Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part 
II (2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/ learypharmaceuticalsettlement.htm.  
[T]here may be a number of considerations that may help determine whether the pioneer 
manufacturer’s payment to the generic is a genuine or sham transaction, without embarking 
upon a too-detailed inquiry into the technical attributes of the property. The following factors 
may be relevant. . . . : 1. The history of the negotiations. . . . 2. Other offers for the intellectual 
property at issue. . . . 3. The apparent value of the property as determined by subsequent 
events. . . . 4. The existence of comparable offers for intellectual property with similar 
attributes. . . . 5. The structure of the payment terms. 
Id. 
 229. Cf. supra note 227. 
 230. Leary, supra note 228. 
 231. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
 232. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4. 
 233. FTC Study, supra note 15, at vi. “Through this 180-day provision, Hatch-Waxman provides 
an incentive for companies to challenge patent validity and ‘design around’ patents to find alternative, 
non-infringing forms of patented drugs.” Id.  
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brand-name drugs.234 However, the Hatch-Waxman Act contained 
loopholes that allowed brand-name pharmaceutical companies to keep 
legitimate generic products off the market.235 In response, the FTC236 
recommended that there should only be one automatic thirty-month stay of 
an ANDA approval237 and that the FDA should more strictly review the 
patents listed in the Orange Book.238 The FDA has largely adopted these 
recommendations in its 2003 Hatch-Waxman regulation,239 and the 
substance of this regulation should be codified by Congress. Congress 
could also create a private cause of action for improperly listing patents in 
the Orange Book. Such a law would comport with the purposes of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, and combined with the threat of antitrust liability for 
exploiting other aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act,240 would continue to 
ensure that generic drugs are available while protecting the intellectual 
property rights of brand name drug manufacturers. While a perfect 
compromise between Americans’ needs for innovative and affordable 
drugs and the revenue needs of drug companies may not be possible, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act needs only to be tweaked, not overhauled. The Act 
has resulted in a good balance of lower-priced drugs and continued 
development, and, if legislatively augmented to account for a few 
loopholes, will continue to give hope to those afflicted with diseases that 
do not currently have effective treatments. 
Douglas A. Robinson∗
 234. See supra note 69. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the 
availability of generic alternatives to brand-name drugs had saved buyers between $8 billion and $10 
billion by 1994. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 9. 
 235. “In spite of this record of success, two of the provisions governing generic drug approval 
prior to patent expiration (the 180-day exclusivity and the 30-month stay provisions) are susceptible to 
strategies that, in some cases, may have prevented the availability of more generic drugs.” FTC Study, 
supra note 15, at i. The 2003 FDA regulation closes the thirty-month stay loophole. See supra note 
140 and accompanying text. 
 236. See FTC Study, supra note 15. 
 237. FTC Study, supra note 15, at ii. 
 238. “[T]he FTC staff has submitted a Citizen Petition to the FDA that seeks guidance concerning 
the criteria that a patent must meet before it can be listed in the Orange Book.” FTC Study, supra note 
15, at 55-56. The FDA provided such guidance through its 2003 regulation. See supra note 139 and 
accompanying text. 
 239. 2003 FDA Hatch-Waxman Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003). 
 240. “The [FTC] has taken antitrust law enforcement actions against certain brand-name and 
generic companies whose allegedly anticompetitive agreements took advantage of one or the other of 
[the automatic 30-month stay or 180-day marketing exclusivity] provisions. Through the rigorous 
enforcement of the antitrust laws, the FTC has taken an active role in ensuring that consumers benefit 
from competition in the pharmaceutical industry.” FTC Study, supra note 14, at i. 
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